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CRITIQUE BY COMPARISON IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
CAROLE GOLDBERG∗ 
 
“A Slippery Slope: Are Tribes Governments or Businesses?”1 
 
As teachers of federal Indian law, we have an obligation to provide 
critical perspectives on the law, not merely to teach the statutes and 
doctrine.  Happily, scholarship in the field affords us a variety of critical 
frameworks.  For example, recent Supreme Court decisions have been 
attacked for their unexplained or unjustified departures from basic 
principles in the field.2  Other lines of criticism take more of a legal process 
approach, challenging the propriety of policy-making by courts rather than 
the Congress.3  Still other strains of critique focus on the tainted origins of 
doctrine in the field, steeped in racism and colonialism.4  And other schol-
ars, drawing on moral and political philosophy, emphasize the divergence 
of doctrine from basic principles of social justice.5 
My focus will be on a different type of criticism that appears regularly 
in the casebook I have co-authored, as well as in the scholarly literature—
criticism that challenges internal inconsistency in the law.  This genre of 
criticism typically looks at the way federal Indian law treats Indian nations, 
and compares that treatment with the way the law treats some other entity, 
one that supposedly shares key characteristics with the tribes.  This critique 
 
 ∗Carol Goldberg, Professor of Law and Director, Joint Degree Program in Law and American 
Indian Studies, UCLA School of Law. 
1. Dan Walters, Op-Ed, A Slippery Slope: Are Tribes Governments or Businesses?, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 15, 2006, at A3. 
2. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of 
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1995); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling 
Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993). 
3. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on 
Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003) [hereinafter Singer, Canons of Conquest] 
(challenging the substance of the Court’s policy-making); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: 
The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind-Justice, and Mainstream Values, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001). 
4. See, e.g., ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005); ROBERT A. 
WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF 
CONQUEST (1989). 
5. See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism: Where do 
Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil Society?, 5 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 357 (2003); Rebecca 
Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1615 (2000). 
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has natural appeal for law students.  They are taught that the Anglo-
American legal system is based on precedent, striving for consistency and 
predictability, and deploying reasoning by analogy.  Like individuals and 
entities should be treated alike.  If you can find a relevant difference, you 
can argue for different treatment.  The challenge, of course, is to determine 
which differences of fact should justify different treatment in law. 
From the earliest days of federal Indian law until the present, the 
struggle to situate tribal polities, lands, and individuals within the Anglo-
American legal system has been a struggle over comparisons and analogies.  
As teachers of the subject, we cannot escape the demands and temptations 
that such comparisons present.  As scholars, we have been treated to some 
serious reflection on the whole subject of comparison-making over the past 
year, focused by Professor Philip Frickey’s penetrating article on (Native) 
American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law in the Harvard Law 
Review,6 and various responses to it posted in the Harvard Law Review 
Forum.7  Professor Frickey challenges the Justices and scholars who want 
to import general constitutional doctrines and values into federal Indian 
law, ending distinctive treatment of tribes where such matters as federal 
preemption, equal protection, and inherent sovereignty are involved.  
Federal Indian law is different for good reasons, he asserts, reasons 
grounded in the uneasy coexistence of American constitutionalism and 
colonialism.  What some of the ensuing commentaries on his article sug-
gest, however, is that federal Indian law cannot always be viewed as sui 
generis within the Anglo-American legal system.  According to this view, 
continuities with non-Indian law are sometimes justified—indeed desired—
in order to achieve justice for Native nations and their peoples and to steer 
clear of racism. 
But when?  Identifying the circumstances where such continuities may 
be appropriate is no small task, as Professor Joseph Singer has noted.8  In 
this article, I want to begin examining, systematically, some of the more 
prominent types of comparisons that arise in federal Indian law, specifically 
as they affect treatment of tribes, and to suggest some criteria for sorting the 
more helpful from the less helpful.  Because our9 classroom critiques of 
 
6. Philip Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. 
REV.  431 (2005). 
7. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, The Renaissance of Tribal Sovereignty, the Negative Doctrinal 
Feedback Loop, and the Rise of a New Exceptionalism, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 47 (2006); Joseph 
William Singer, “Double Bind:” Indian Nations v. The Supreme Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(2005) [hereinafter Singer, Double Blind]. 
8. Singer, Double Blind, supra note 7, at 9. 
9. In the remainder of this article, the words “we” and “our” refer to teachers of federal 
Indian law, unless the text indicates otherwise. 
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federal Indian law decisions and statutes so often rest on implicit or explicit 
comparisons or the denial of such comparisons, I have constructed this 
exercise with teaching strategies as well as scholarly discourse in mind. 
To frame the question most directly, how should Anglo-American law 
conceive of the Native Nation or Indian tribe in relation to other, more 
familiar legal constructs?  Should it be treated the same as a foreign nation?  
As a state of the Union?  As a municipal entity?  As a private property 
owner?  As a government property owner?  As a corporate business?  As an 
ethnic group?  As none of the above, because its position is too distinct?  
One could answer that courts should simply rely on characterizations 
offered by the political branches, following or rejecting comparisons as 
Congress and the Executive Branch have dictated in treaties, statutes, and 
regulations.  That would be fine if the positive law afforded a crisp and 
comprehensive characterization.  Alas, it does not. The Constitution 
addresses the character of Indian tribes in relation to other entities only 
obliquely.10  And statutory law offers no consistent treatment, as a look at 
the federal environmental laws reveals.  In some statutes, such as the Clean 
Air Act11 and the Clean Water Act,12 Native Nations are clearly classified 
the same as states of the Union.  Yet, in the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, Native Nations are treated the same as municipalities.13  
Similarly, in the Nonintercourse Acts,14  Native Nations are framed as 
property owners.  Yet in other federal statutes, where Native Nations could 
conceivably hold rights as property owners, such as the basic civil rights 
act,15 their status is not mentioned at all.  For the tribes that have treaties, 
those documents were almost never intended to clarify the comparisons 
between tribes and other legal entities, leaving one to develop a theory of 
appropriate comparison. 
II. TRIBES COMPARED WITH FOREIGN NATIONS 
In the early nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court decided its 
first major Indian law case, Johnson v. M’Intosh,16 the prevailing natural 
law philosophy demanded “reasoned” comparisons in order to establish 
 
10. See discussion of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), infra at notes 
24-32. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2000). 
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13) (2000). 
14. Now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  But see Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop 
Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701, 711-12 (2003) (finding that tribes may not use § 1983 
to vindicate sovereign rights). 
16. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
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appropriate legal rules.  Courts felt obliged to consider the requirements of 
“natural justice,” which were thought to be accessible to “natural reason;” 
and natural reason presupposed logical consistency.  In Johnson, the ques-
tion was whether a Native nation could hold and convey full fee simple title 
to the property within its territory, with those property rights surviving 
cession of that territory to another sovereign, Chief Justice Marshall looked 
to Europe for a familiar analogy.  He framed the inquiry as whether private 
property owners in one European country would retain full title even after 
their country came under the political domination of another European 
country.  Since the Napoleonic and Austro-Hungarian Empires were known 
phenomena around that time, this was not an entirely speculative project.  
Marshall’s conclusion was that private property rights would be retained in 
the European context in order to foster the integration of the dominated 
peoples into the new political arrangement.  Then, having asserted this 
comparison, Chief Justice Marshall rejected it on the basis of differences 
between indigenous North Americans and Europeans, which made such 
integration impossible, as well as on the basis of positive law to the con-
trary.  Instead, Chief Justice Marshall set forth what has become known as 
the “doctrine of discovery,” which limited the rights of Native nations in 
their territory by inserting an ownership interest in the “discovering 
sovereign” or its successor, which in Johnson v. M’Intosh was the United 
States. 
As a teacher of federal Indian law, my first impulse has been to accept 
the comparison as valid, and then to challenge Marshall’s bases for 
rejecting it.  The characterization of Native peoples as savage hunters was 
erroneous and racist,17 and scholars such as Stuart Banner have exposed the 
characterization of positive law as partial and historically inaccurate.18  
Questioning Chief Justice Marshall’s failure to follow the European com-
parison is also the approach that Professor Kip Bobroff advocates in his 
article about how to teach Johnson v. M’Intosh in a first-year course on 
property.19  Professor Bobroff presents us with a little-studied Supreme 
Court decision that appears to set up the exact comparison that Chief Justice 
Marshall addressed hypothetically in Johnson.  The case, United States v. 
Percheman,20 came ten years after Johnson, and considered whether an 
 
17. See ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG, & REBECCA TSOSIE, AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 61-63 (Rev. 4th ed. 2005). 
18. See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE 
FRONTIER (2005). 
19. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Indian Law in Property: Johnson v. M’Intosh and Beyond, 37 
TULSA L. REV. 521 (2001). 
20. 32 U.S. 51 (1833). 
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individual who had received a Spanish grant of land in what is now Florida 
would retain his property rights after Spain ceded the entire Florida territory 
to the United States.  Bobroff points out that in the course of a decision that 
favored the private property claimant, the same Chief Justice Marshall who 
decided Johnson v. M’Intosh wrote: 
The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be 
violated; that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged 
and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private 
property should be generally confiscated, and private rights 
annulled.  The people change their allegiance; their relation to their 
ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, 
and their rights of property remain undisturbed.  If this be the 
modern rule, even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its 
application to the case of an amicable cession of territory?  . . . A 
cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the 
property belonging to its inhabitants.  The king cedes that only 
which belonged to him; lands he previously granted, were not his 
to cede.  Neither party could so understand the cession.  Neither 
party could consider itself as attempting a wrong to individuals 
condemned by the practice of the whole civilized world.21 
Nowhere in this passage or anywhere else in the opinion does Johnson v. 
M’Intosh even merit a mention.  Bobroff’s point is that considerations of  
“race and culture” determined the different outcomes in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh and United States v. Percheman; and implicit in his claim is that 
such considerations are inappropriate.  The tribe that granted the land in 
Johnson was just as much a nation as Spain, and therefore its grant of land 
should have been respected in the same way after a cession of territory to 
the United States.  The appropriate analogy, then, was between a Native 
nation and a foreign, European state. 
Such a comparison between the land grant of the Illinois and 
Piankeshaw Indians on the one hand and the land grant of Spain on the 
other has strong appeal.  The cases also present interesting differences, 
however.  First, at the level of positive law, the land cession from the Tribe 
to the United States and the cession from Spain addressed private property 
rights differently.  The Tribes’ treaty with the United States included no 
terms protecting existing private property rights.  Spain, in contrast, had 
included specific terms in its treaty of February 22, 1819, which protected 
 
21. Percheman, 32 U.S. at 86-87. 
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the rights of preexisting private property owners.22  This difference in the 
treaties should perhaps come as no surprise, as the private property holders 
in Illinois and Piankeshaw territory were not people toward whom the Tribe 
felt any allegiance.  Thus, Johnson v. M’Intosh  could merely reflect the 
Court’s deference to a different positive law as the context for its “natural 
law” analysis. 
Second, as the Court noted in Johnson v. M’Intosh itself, it was not at 
all clear that the original grant made by the Illinois and Piankeshaw was 
designed to convey a full ownership interest to the grantees.  In contrast, 
Spain, which was in the business of rewarding its influential and loyal 
citizens with land grants, intended that its grants convey full private 
property rights.23  Indeed, the value of those rights probably depended on 
individuals’ expectations that Spain would look out for them in negotiations 
with other countries.  A different characterization for the tribal grant to 
Johnson’s predecessor can be inferred from the Tribe’s later cession of the 
same land to the United States without any protection for existing private 
property rights.  It is also suggested by the nature of most tribes’ legal 
systems, which did not generally acknowledge property rights beyond 
revocable use rights.  In other words, as Professor Milner Ball has pointed 
out,24 the underlying assumption of natural law in the international realm 
was that the granting sovereign intended a full private property grant.  If 
that condition was not met, then the natural law requirement did not apply. 
When considering the comparison between Native nations and 
European states, the problem with Johnson v. M’Intosh is not its unwilling-
ness to draw an appropriate analogy, but its elaboration of doctrines of 
discovery and aboriginal title that were not necessary to the decision in the 
case.  The Court would have done better, according to this view, to stick to 
the analogy to foreign nations, and then explain why the different treaty 
language and national (tribal) property law dictated a different decision than 
if the granting sovereign had been Spain or another European nation. 
Of course, not long after Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Court again 
confronted the comparison between Native nations and foreign nations in 
 
22. Treaty with Spain, February 22, 1819, art. VIII: 
All the grants of land made before the 24th of January, 1818, by His Catholic Majesty, 
or by his lawful authorities, in the said territories ceded by His Majesty to the United 
States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the 
same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under 
the dominion of His Catholic Majesty. 
23. See Elizabeth Nelson Patrick, Land Grants During the Administration of Spanish 
Colonial Governor Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta, 51 N.M. HIST. REV. 5, 6 (1976). 
24. Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3. 
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Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.25  Cherokee Nation posed the question 
squarely in relation to positive law, specifically Article III of the Consti-
tution.  The Cherokee wanted to invoke the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction for its suit against the state of Georgia, arguing that it presented 
a controversy “between a state . . . and foreign states,” within the meaning 
of Article III, section 2.26  The Court rejected the characterization of the 
Cherokee Nation as a “foreign state,” relying in part on the distinction 
drawn in the Indian commerce clause between “commerce . . . with the 
Indian tribes” and “commerce with foreign nations.”  Had the framers of the 
Constitution believed Indian tribes were the same as foreign nations, the 
Court observed, they would not have referred to them in separate and 
distinct phrases. 
In Cherokee Nation, the Court also offers some natural law-inspired 
discussion of the nature of Indian tribes, considering whether they match 
the characteristics of foreign nations in relation to the United States.  This 
discussion, which gives rise to the oft-quoted and obscure characterization 
of tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” first considers whether the 
Cherokee Nation is properly deemed a “state,” and then focuses on what it 
means for one state to be “foreign” to another state.  Can a state be foreign 
at the same time it acknowledges itself to be “dependent” and under the 
“protection” of another?  As Justice Thompson noted in dissent, “A weak 
state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection 
of one or more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, 
and ceasing to be a state.”27  Yet, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the 
majority, used that very dependent position of the Cherokee Nation as a 
reason to deny it the status of a “foreign” state.  Not surprisingly, as 
teachers of federal Indian law, we criticize that denial of the comparison to 
foreign states.  In our casebook, for example, Professors Clinton, Tsosie, 
and I note that international status is given today to at least two “feudatory” 
states that depend for protection and defense on other nations—Monaco, 
which relies on France, and the Vatican, which relies on Italy.28  Both are 
 
25. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
26. An interesting question is why the case did not qualify for original jurisdiction based on 
the fact that a state was a party and a federal question was involved.  Apparently, the possibility of 
federal question jurisdiction was not raised, and the litigants may have assumed that unless the 
tribe fit into one of the categories of parties included in Article III, it lacked capacity to sue. 
27. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 54. 
28. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 75.  For a similar critique of the Cherokee Nation 
holding, see Vine Deloria, Jr., The Size and Status of Nations, in NATIVE AMERICAN VOICES: A 
READER 457-65 (Susan Lobo & Steve Talbot, eds., 1998).  Deloria argues that in terms of 
geographic size, population, location in relation to other countries, and degree of economic 
dependence, many Native nations are quite similar to countries maintaining independent sovereign 
status as foreign nations.  Id. 
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represented in some way in the United Nations.  Monaco is a member of the 
General Assembly, and the Vatican has a permanent observer status.  While 
the positive law argument may have some force, the argument from 
essential difference between foreign states and Native nations is one we 
challenge. 
But if, as teachers of Indian law, we are drawn to the international 
comparison in Johnson v. M’Intosh and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, we 
often recoil from it in addressing a case decided in the opening years of the 
twentieth century, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.29  Lone Wolf considers whether 
the United States may abrogate treaties with Indian nations through 
subsequently enacted legislation.  After rejecting the comparison between 
tribes and foreign states in Cherokee Nation, the Court embraces it in Lone 
Wolf, pointing out that since federal law affirms the power of the Congress 
to pass laws that conflict with international treaties, it follows that Congress 
can pass laws that abrogate Indian treaties.30  Is that a sound analogy?  Our 
casebook offers reasons to doubt that it is, questioning whether the 
consequences of unilaterally abrogating a foreign treaty are the same as the 
consequences of unilaterally abrogating an Indian treaty.31  We ask, 
Does it make any difference that Indian tribes are geographically 
within exterior boundaries of the United States and foreign nations 
are not?  Does unilateral abrogation of a foreign treaty enlarge 
United States sovereignty over the foreign government, its lands, 
or people?  Did abrogation of the Medicine Lodge Treaty do so in 
Lone Wolf to the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache?  Is this 
difference a sufficient reason to formulate a different rule for 
Indian treaties?32 
Interestingly, at least one of the grounds we suggest for distinguishing 
Indian treaties from foreign treaties, namely the presence of Indian nations 
within the geographical boundaries of the United States, is one of the very 
reasons Chief Justice Marshall gave for distinguishing Indian nations from 
foreign states in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.33 
As teachers, are we merely picking and choosing among the compari-
sons between Native nations and foreign states to argue for results favoring 
tribal parties?  Is there perhaps some principled basis for favoring the 
comparison in the case of Johnson v. M’Intosh and Cherokee Nation v. 
 
29. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
30. Id. at 566. 
31. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 452-53.  
32. Id. 
33. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 15, 18 (1831). 
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Georgia and then opposing it in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock?  Would changes 
in the circumstances of Indian nations between the early nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries justify dropping a once-valid comparison?  Or 
should we be avoiding all these arguments from comparison altogether as 
hopelessly inadequate to the normative work of federal Indian law?  
Although in recent years many proponents of indigenous rights have 
concluded that indigenous autonomy need not be equated with full rights of 
self-determination as a nation-state,34 the question of comparison of tribes 
with foreign nations lingers for teachers of federal Indian law.  What is 
interesting to me about our pedagogy is that we often invoke these 
comparisons or challenge them without engaging the appropriateness of the 
endeavor at some broader level. 
III. TRIBES COMPARED WITH STATES OF THE UNION 
Some Native nations that entered into early treaties with the United 
States were offered a form of representation in the American government;35 
and the possibility of turning the Indian Territory (later Oklahoma) into a 
multi-tribal state of the Union attracted some interest in the late nineteenth 
century.36  Still, nothing in American constitutional law or treaties posits 
that Native nations are the equivalent of the states.  And only recently have 
some federal environmental statutes37 and locally-administered federal 
benefit programs38 put Indian nations on par with states. 
Nonetheless, opportunities to analogize Native nations to states arise 
regularly in the teaching of federal Indian law, and a frequently heard 
critique of the Court’s contemporary Indian law decisions is that the Court 
denies Native nations the same kinds of governmental powers typically 
exercised by states.  Illustrations abound.  In discussions of federal 
“plenary” power over Indian affairs, the ebbs and flows of congressional 
power under the Indian Commerce Clause are often compared with similar 
movements in judicial interpretation of the interstate Commerce Clause.  
Specifically, as Supreme Court decisions of the past decade have contained 
 
34. See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-10 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
35. See Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation, art. 6, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13; Treaty 
of Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation,  art. 12, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18. 
36. See ANNIE H. ABEL, PROPOSALS FOR AN INDIAN STATE 1778-1878, ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 89, 94-102 (1907). 
37. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
38. For example, tribes and intertribal groups are included in the definition of “state 
agencies” that can receive direct federal funding under the federal Special Supplemental Nutrition 
Program for Women, Infants, and Children program.  42 U.S.C. § 1786(b)(13) (2000).  See 
generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005). 
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the reach of federal power over interstate commerce,39 we have questioned 
the Court’s consistency in continuing to uphold robust federal power over 
Indian affairs.  As Professors Clinton, Tsosie, and I noted in our casebook, 
In the arena of federal-state relations, the United States Supreme 
Court recently has been quite active in limiting the scope of power 
of Congress in order to protect state sovereignty on the ostensible 
ground that the states and their people never consented to or 
delegated broad, plenary commerce powers to the federal govern-
ment. . . .  At core, these cases are quite inconsistent with the idea 
that Congress has broad authority to curtail or eliminate the 
sovereign power of states as Martinez [Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 57 (1978)] and Yankton Sioux [South 
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 344 (1998)] suggest 
it can do for tribes.  Why should such differences exist?  Given the 
nature of the treaty relationship, would not an even-handed appli-
cation to Indian tribes of the same legal principles the Court 
applies to states suggest a total lack of federal authority over the 
tribes and their members without their consent reflected in a treaty 
or treaty-substitute?  . . . Why has the Supreme Court not applied 
the same principles even-handedly between protecting state sover-
eignty through the New Federalism cases and protecting tribal 
sovereignty from the excesses of the exercise of congressional 
power?40 
If we are not arguing that Native nations are generally the equivalent of 
states, at least we are suggesting that in certain relevant respects, Native 
nations and states share certain attributes, particularly lack of consent to the 
extension of federal power. 
In other situations, teachers and scholars of federal Indian law raise 
concerns about the Court’s consistency in denying jurisdiction to tribes 
under circumstances where state jurisdiction is clearly recognized.  For 
example, as Sarah Krakoff points out,41 the Supreme Court has denied 
tribes authority, exclusive of the states, to impose sales taxes on non-Indian 
purchasers buying goods on reservations, purportedly because it is wrong 
for tribes to “market a tax exemption.”42  Yet states are allowed to do this 
 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
40. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 466. 
41. Krakoff, supra note 7, at 51.  
42. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980). 
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all the time, competing for customers by marketing their lower taxes.43  
Likewise, one of the reasons the Court has given for denying tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians is that non-Indians are ineligible to become 
tribal citizens.44  Yet states regularly exercise jurisdiction over non-citizens.  
It is true that some of these non-citizens subject to state jurisdiction may be 
eligible to become state citizens if they change their residence, at least those 
who are American citizens.  However, at the time the state jurisdiction is 
exercised over them, that eligibility does them no good.  Non-citizens are 
still unable to exercise any political influence over the state government that 
is attempting to regulate their conduct or their property.  And the foreigners 
subjected to state jurisdiction may never be able to become state citizens.  
Interestingly, even Professor Frickey, who articulates a view of federal 
Indian law as “exceptional,” complains that Native nations are not 
acknowledged to have the same sovereign powers over non-citizens as 
states of the Union.45  As we ask in our casebook, 
Can New Mexico exercise criminal jurisdiction over an Arizona 
citizen for a murder committed in New Mexico even though the 
Arizona citizen could not vote for the legislators who enacted the 
murder statute?  Is the federal government [or any state] prevented 
from charging Manuel Noriega or other foreign nationals allegedly 
engaged in drug trafficking merely because they are foreign 
nationals who are ineligible for United States citizenship?46 
Likewise, our casebook criticizes the refusal to analogize tribal courts 
to state courts in Nevada v. Hicks,47 where the Court denied tribal civil 
jurisdiction over state officers who executed a search on reservation trust 
land.  In the course of his opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that tribal courts 
are not courts of general jurisdiction.48  But if state courts can be courts of 
general jurisdiction, we ask, exercising jurisdiction over claims arising 
under any body of law unless expressly prohibited from doing so, why 
shouldn’t tribal courts have the same status?49  Don’t both tribal and state 
court systems derive their authority from internal sources,50 unlike the 
 
43. Krakoff, supra note 7, at 51 n.22. Krakoff gives the example of the tri-state area, where 
New Yorkers often travel to New Jersey to purchase consumer goods in order to avoid higher 
New York sales taxes.  Id.   
44. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). 
45. See Frickey, supra note 6, at 477-479.  See also Singer, Double Blind, supra note 6, at 7-
8. 
46. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 566. 
47. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
48. Nevada, 533 U.S. at 367. 
49. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 854-55. 
50. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
      
730 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:719 
federal courts which are courts of limited jurisdiction because they have 
been granted limited powers by the states that formed the Union?  As 
Acting Chief Justice Robert Clinton wrote in his opinion for the Las Vegas 
Paiute Court of Appeal, an opinion excerpted in our casebook, “federal 
preemption of tribal jurisdiction [through the implicit divestiture doctrine] 
no more makes a tribal court a court of limited jurisdiction than the federal 
preemption of state jurisdiction over antitrust, federal securities regulation, 
or federal copyright or patent cases makes the state courts into courts of 
limited jurisdiction.”51 
Indian law teachers’ comparisons between Native nations and states 
has extended to the statutory realm as well.  Often this comparison of 
statutory treatment of tribes and states produces a criticism, usually taking 
the form that Congress or the courts have improperly failed to accord tribes 
the same status as states with respect to benefit programs, exemptions from 
federal taxation, regulation, or other federal measures.  For example, as 
federal benefit programs increasingly entail state administration of block 
grants, tribes have complained that the different circumstances existing 
within Indian country require separate allocations to tribes rather than 
dependence on negotiations with states.  A clear illustration is the difficulty 
many tribes have encountered in obtaining a proportionate amount of funds 
allocated to states under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act52 to cover the 
costs of food, shelter, clothing, and other supplies for eligible children 
placed in foster care or for adoption.  Under the Act, funds are available 
only if the child’s placement and care are the responsibility of the state or 
some agency that has an agreement with the state.53  Yet for most on-
reservation children, the only entity with jurisdiction to make a foster care 
placement is a tribal agency.54  Thus, if the state refuses to enter into an 
agreement with the tribe, Title IV-E funding cannot flow to the foster 
parents of children subject to tribal placements.  Indian child welfare advo-
cates have certainly pressed the equivalence of Native nations and states for 
this purpose, as have Indian law teachers and scholars who pay attention to 
the Indian Child Welfare Act.55 
 
51. Terry-Carpenter v. Las Vegas Paiute Tribal Council, No. CA-01-01 at n.2 (Las Vegas 
Paiute Ct. App. 2002), excerpted in CLINTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 356. 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 672 (2000). 
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2); Native Vill. of Stevens v. Smith, 770 F.2d 1486, 1488-89 (9th 
Cir. 1985); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 38, at 1405. 
54. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2000) (stating that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
child welfare matters affecting Indian children who live on reservations, absent federal law 
granting jurisdiction to the state). 
55. See, e.g., B.J. Jones, In Their Native Lands: The Status of American Indian Children in 
North Dakota, 75 N.D. L. REV. 241, 255-59 (1999). 
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Where federal law is silent with respect to tribes but mentions states, 
Indian law teachers often must ask their students whether any special 
treatment or exemptions accorded to states should be extended to tribes as 
well.  The issue arises in numerous contexts, including interpreting the “full 
faith and credit” provisions of the Constitution and its implementing federal 
statute,56 determining the proper scope of federal tax laws concerned with 
issuance of tax exempt government bonds,57 and deciding whether the 
National Labor Relations Act applies to tribal casinos.58   
In the full faith and credit context, the legal question is whether tribal 
courts are included in the obligations of mutual enforcement of orders and 
judgments imposed upon the states and territories of the United States.  
With respect to some kinds of orders and judgments, Congress has clearly 
included tribes among the governments entitled to respect and mutual 
enforcement.59  Sharply different answers to this question have emerged 
among Indian law scholars as well as among state and federal courts, 
leaving Indian law teachers with a topic ripe for interesting discussion.60  
Do Native nations benefit from the comparison with states and territories, 
especially since the obligations are reciprocal, and tribes would have to 
enforce state judgments as well as having their own judgments enforced in 
state courts?  How could we go about assessing their interests in inclusion 
or exclusion?  For example, would we have to know whether it was more 
likely that tribes would want to be able to have their judgments enforced in 
state courts, as opposed to states wanting to have their judgments enforced 
in tribal courts?  How, exactly, would tribes be integrated into the federal 
system if they were to be treated like states and territories under these 
provisions? 
In the tax-exempt bond and labor law contexts, the analysis of tribal-
state comparisons is different, because the tribes largely benefit from 
treatment as states under these legal regimes, and do not assume reciprocal 
burdens.  Nonetheless, challenging questions emerge because of agencies’ 
and courts’ concern that Native nations sometimes function more like 
business entities than like state governments, and therefore do not deserve 
treatment as states.  Although federal laws dealing with tax treatment of 
 
56. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the federal 
obligation of full faith and credit does not extend to tribal judgments). 
57. See Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process, 46 
ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (1994). 
58. See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1005 (2004), 2005 NLRB LEXIS 
286 (holding that the National Labor Relations Act applies to tribal operations). 
59. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2000) (Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act). 
60. For a list of articles on this subject, see CLINTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 293. 
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tribes rarely receive much attention in Indian law casebooks,61 the general 
view put forward there, as in scholarly work in the field, is that tribal 
commercial development is the object of improper discrimination if it is 
treated differently for tax purposes from the many commercial development 
projects initiated by state and municipal governments.62  Emphasis is placed 
on the fact that tribes, like states, have obligations to provide their citizens 
with public services, infrastructure development, and economic oppor-
tunities.  One commentator has even argued that it is racist for the federal 
government to deny tribes the same tax treatment as states.63 
Critiques have also been leveled at the National Labor Relations 
Board’s recent decision applying the National Labor Relations Act to tribal 
commercial activities employing large numbers of non-Indians,64 even 
though the Act specifically excludes state governments without reference to 
the type of employment offered by the state.65  Some of the court decisions 
addressing federal laws of general applicability suggest that a court 
deciding whether a tribe is exempted from a general federal law may take 
into account whether the tribal activity in question has a commercial as well 
as a conventionally governmental dimension.66  As one commentator has 
suggested, 
This rule demonstrates how courts are forced to distinguish tribal 
activities, but not state activities, regardless of whether the 
employment offered by the state is governmental in nature or 
solely commercial. This difference in treatment between states and 
tribes is incorrect logic.  Both states and tribes are sovereigns in 
their own right, and there is no plausible reason for differentiating 
between them. 67 
This commentator points to the taxing, law-making, and judicial powers of 
Native nations, among other governmental powers that they share with 
states.  She also notes that tribes enjoy more power than states, by virtue of 
 
61. See id. at 748-49 (providing a small exception and discussing whether tribal casino 
revenues should have the same exemption from federal taxation as state lottery revenues). 
62. Id; see also Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bondage: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory 
Restraints on Tribal Economic Development, Michigan Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-006, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931486. 
63. Id. 
64. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1005 (2004); 2004 NLRB LEXIS 
286. 
65. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000). 
66. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
67. Ann Richards, Application of the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to Indian Tribes: Thwarting the Economic Self-Determination of Tribes, 30 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 203, 217-18 (2005/2006). 
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their inherent sovereignty as nations predating the United States.  States, by 
contrast, “were never independent nations.”68  With even greater power 
than states, tribes should always be treated as governments, and their 
employment always interpreted as governmental in nature.  Even when their 
businesses make money, those businesses are “imperative to tribal self-
determination,” and that money is “predominantly for the benefit of the 
tribal government and members.”69 
As teachers of federal Indian law, should we be devoting time and 
energy to arguments about the “illogic” of treating tribes differently than 
states for such purposes?  Certainly we need to consider whether there are 
differences between Native nations and states that warrant differences in 
treatment.70  Both states and tribes are subject to federal law.  A crucial 
difference between them, however, is that states consented to this 
arrangement in the Constitution, and Native nations did not.71  Furthermore, 
as Professor Clinton has noted, these two sets of governmental entities may 
not be similarly situated with respect to the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, with only states subject to direct federal review of their 
decisions regarding federal law.72  Native nations are also not subject to the 
limiting force of the Fourteenth Amendment,73 although the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 196874 has extended many of those individual rights 
protections to persons affected by tribal action.  Furthermore, when we 
compare state jurisdiction over non-citizens with tribal jurisdiction, as 
Professors Frickey and Singer do, we must keep in mind that an American 
residing in a state is eligible to become a voter after a very short period of 
 
68. Id. at 218. 
69. Id. at 219. 
70. For example, the United States Supreme Court has justified its special federal preemption 
doctrine for Indian law by contrasting Indian nations with states of the Union: 
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply 
to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have 
emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reservations are not States, and the 
differences in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to 
one notions of pre-emption that are properly applied to the other. The tradition of 
Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal members must inform the 
determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by 
operation of federal law. 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). 
71. See Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365 
(1989). 
72. See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002).  But see Richards, supra note 67, at 218 (asserting that tribes and states 
are “extremely similar” in their relationship to federal law). 
73. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 
(1896). 
74. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000). 
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time,75 while an American non-tribal member who has lived on a reserva-
tion for decades is not and will never become eligible for citizenship.  
Furthermore, a state of the Union never has to be concerned about another 
state having sovereignty within its boundaries, while a Native nation must, 
at least under federal Indian law doctrine dating from the late nineteenth 
century.76  In this litany of arguable differences between states and tribes, 
we should also note that implicit in the way United States law deals with 
states is an assumption of basic normative regularity among them, despite 
local differences.  That assumption does not hold for many Native nations.  
Indeed, one of the mainstays of normative appeals for tribal sovereignty is 
that Native nations need autonomy in order to maintain alternative 
normative orders. 
We also find some anomalous ways in which Native nations act in 
ways that states do not—ways that may make them appear to be more like 
private entities than like governments.  The most noteworthy of these is the 
financial participation of tribes in state and federal elections,77 something 
that states appear not to be able to do.  Indeed, it was tribal claims that 
tribes are entitled to make state campaign contributions that provoked the 
headline quoted at the outset of this article.  Interestingly, one research 
paper that appeared to approve of tribal involvement in state and federal 
elections skirted the question of tribes’ similarity to states, asserting that 
“Indian tribes occupy a unique legal status: not of a corporation, municipal 
government, association, cooperative or any other familiar legal entity, but 
rather distinct communities that represent the interests of Indian people.”78  
Indeed, one could argue that Native nations should be allowed to participate 
in state elections, even though states themselves may not, because only 
Native nations are subject to the exercise of state power directly over their 
people, via statutes such as Public Law 280 that were passed without their 
consent.79  This, of course, is an argument from difference, not from 
similarity with states, a difference that alludes to the history of colonialism. 
 
75. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down one-year state durational resi-
dency requirement for voting as violation of equal protection clause). 
76. See, e.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). 
77. See Cameron A. Reese, Tribal Immunity from California’s Campaign Contribution 
Disclosure Requirements, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 793, 823-24; Russ Lehman, The Emerging Role of 
Native Americans in the American Electoral Process, First American Education Project, 
Evergreen State College (Jan. 1, 2003), available at http://www.first-americans.net/electoral.pdf. 
78. Lehman, supra note 77.  
79. Public Law 280 is a federal statute authorizing certain state criminal and civil jurisdiction 
within Indian country in certain states.  For an explanation of Public Law 280, see COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 38, at § 6.04[3].  For an early and spirited 
debate over the propriety of tribes and their members participating in state and federal politics, see 
John LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in American 
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Are we left with Native nations as appropriately equated with states, so 
that as teachers of federal Indian law we can train our students to look for 
illogical or unfair instances of disparate treatment?  As is probably clear by 
now, my pitch is for more sustained attention to the validity of the 
comparison at a deeper level, so that when we arrive at specific instances of 
potential comparison, we have an effective theory of the similarities and 
differences between the two polities within the United States system.  Any 
such comparisons need to take account of the history of colonialism and 
meaning of the federal trust responsibility to Native nations.  In fact, the 
“gotcha” claim of hypocrisy and/or racism within United States law may be 
deflated and turned back on the tribes if tribal opponents are able to seize 
upon inconsistencies in the use of the tribal-state comparison. 
IV. TRIBES COMPARED WITH PROPERTY OWNERS 
Except where reservations have been wholly allotted or land bases 
entirely lost, Native nations are property owners as well as governments, 
holding land in common for the members of the tribe and often assigning it 
to individuals or families for residential, commercial, or other uses.  Tribal 
property rights are a central topic in federal Indian law classes, and we are 
invariably confronted with comparisons between Native nations as property 
owners and other holders of property rights, with Native nations frequently 
receiving less protection.  Professor Joseph Williams Singer, a nationally 
known expert in the field of American property law as well as an esteemed 
federal Indian law scholar, has presented these disparities with particular 
force.80  In his articles on Indian law, we are required to confront the 
unexplained and unjustified differences between the treatment of tribal 
property and the treatment of all other property. 
The Court’s refusal to grant compensation for the taking of Native 
nations’ aboriginal title in their lands is a particularly striking instance of 
such disparity,81 especially after the Court had earlier described aboriginal 
title as being “as sacred as the fee simple of the Whites.”82  The Court’s 
 
Politics: A Reply to Professor Porter, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533 (2001); Robert B. Porter, 
The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal 
Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107 
(1999). 
80. See Singer, Double Blind, supra note 7, at 4-6; Joseph Williams Singer, Lone Wolf or 
How to Take Property by Calling It a “Mere Change in the Form of Investment,” 38 TULSA L. 
REV. 37, 44 (2002) [hereinafter Singer, Lone Wolf]; Joseph Williams Singer, Well-Settled?: The 
Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481 (1994). 
81. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Singer, Double Blind, 
supra note 6, at 4-6. 
82. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835). 
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reasons for denying compensation to aboriginal title simply do not stand up 
if we compare the nature of the Indians’ property claims to those of non-
Indians.83  Another noteworthy instance of this differential treatment is the 
Court’s allowance of forced allotment, redistributing tribal property to 
individual tribal members without the tribe’s consent.  As Professor Singer 
has taught us, the forced distribution of tribal lands to individual tribal 
citizens looks like just as much of an unconstitutional “taking” as the forced 
distribution of corporate assets to the corporation’s shareholders.84  Another 
striking illustration that has received somewhat less attention is the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of tribal water rights in the case of Nevada v. 
United States.85  There, the Court refused to allow litigation of the Pyramid 
Lake Paiute Tribe’s claims because those claims had already been 
adjudicated in an earlier proceeding in which the United States represented 
the Tribe as trustee.  The Tribe responded that the United States had 
simultaneously represented conflicting interests in the earlier proceeding, a 
fact that would have triggered a violation of the due process rights of any 
private property owner.86  The Court dismissed that concern, however, 
based on its view that Congress had directed the trustee to split its 
loyalties.87 
The disparate treatment of tribal and other property rights seems to 
have carried over to the property rights of Indian trust allottees.  Known as 
the Cobell litigation,88 this case has provided ample ammunition for those 
who want to argue that Indian property is not respected as much as non-
Indian property.  Now in its eleventh year, the lawsuit claims that the 
Department of the Interior has mismanaged trust assets, by, among other 
things, failure to maintain adequate records, failure to collect revenue due, 
and failure to provide accurate accountings to the beneficiaries.  These 
would all be clear violations by a private trustee, and would require prompt 
remediation.  Yet the United States government, through its attorneys, has 
staunchly resisted compliance with its obligations.  Indeed, the possibly 
excessive reaction of Judge Lamberth, who was removed from his presiding 
 
83. Singer, Canons of Conquest, supra note 2, at 4-6. 
84. Singer, Lone Wolf, supra note 80, at 43-45. 
85. 463 U.S. 110 (1983). 
86. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
87. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135-36 n.15. 
88. There have been numerous court decisions in this litigation.  See www.indiantrust.com 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2006).  The most important substantive ruling occurred in Cobell v. Norton, 
240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001), where the D.C. Circuit found that general trust principles and 
federal legislation imposed judicially enforceable trust obligations on the United States in the 
management of the individual allottees’ individual accounts, and that the Departments of Interior 
and Treasury have breached those legal obligations. 
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role in that case,89 seems to have been prompted by his outrage that private 
property of individual Indians was being treated so shabbily by the 
supposed federal trustees, something that would not be tolerated as to non-
Indian trust beneficiaries.90 
As casebook authors in federal Indian law, my colleagues and I have 
been quick to incorporate such critiques based on inconsistent treatment of 
Indian and other property owners.91  What we have not done is to examine 
how such arguments from comparison with private property owners (or for 
that matter, other governmental entities that may own property) fit into the 
larger discussion of the exceptional nature of federal Indian law within the 
American constitutional scheme.  Professor Singer has launched us on that 
journey in his response to Professor Frickey,92 but we have some distance to 
go. 
We know, for example, that in the international context, it is not 
uncommon for countries that overtake others to claim the “sovereign” lands 
of the subordinated government, leaving individual property rights 
protected.  Professor Stuart Banner has suggested that this concern led 
Hawaiian monarchs in the pre-American period to privatize collectively 
held lands in anticipation of a likely American seizure of the islands. 93  But 
for Native nations that had no notion of privately owned property (as 
opposed to privately used property) before contact with the United States, 
the status of their lands was difficult to incorporate into this dichotomy.94  
Non-Indian governmental entities may be property owners, but except 
under socialism, they are rarely the owners of their entire territory.  Their 
 
89. See Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
90. See Cobell v. Norton, 229 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2005).  “[O]ur ‘modern’ Interior 
department,” United States District Court Judge Lamberth declared, is “a dinosaur—the morally 
and culturally oblivious hand-me-down of a disgracefully racist and imperialist government that 
should have been buried a century ago, the last pathetic outpost of the indifference and 
anglocentrism we thought we had left behind.”  Id.  Judge Lamberth also stated, “our government 
still treats Native American Indians as if they were somehow less than deserving of the respect 
that should be afforded to everyone in a society where all people are supposed to be equal.” Id.  
What seems to have exercised the D.C. Circuit panel was their perception that Judge Lamberth 
viewed this disparate treatment as evidence of current “racism” by the Department of the Interior, 
an inference we have seen drawn in other instances where tribes are treated differently from other 
entities. See Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also supra note 61 
and accompanying text. 
91. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 1019-23, 1031-39, 1124. 
92. Singer, Double Blind, supra note 7. 
93. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Preparing to Be Colonized: Land Tenure and Legal Strategy in 
Nineteenth-Century Hawaii, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 273 (2005). 
94. For in-depth analysis of the clash of property regimes that affected indigenous land rights 
after the coming of the British to New Zealand, see Stuart Banner, Conquest by Contract: Wealth 
Transfer and Land Market Structure in Colonial New Zealand, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 47 (2000); 
Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand, 
24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 807 (1999). 
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claims to sovereignty are not founded in treaties that reserved or set aside 
lands for their collective use under the protection of another government.  
In other words, the connections between property and sovereignty are not 
nearly so intimate.  These differences may not be sufficient to warrant 
disparate treatment of tribal property claims.  But until we confront them, 
particularly as they relate to claims of the special status of Native nations, 
we will not be fully serving the aims of Indian law pedagogy as well as 
scholarship. 
V. TRIBES COMPARED WITH PRIVATE BUSINESSES 
The comparison of Indian nations with private businesses is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, nourished by the spectacular growth, for some Indian 
nations, of tribal gaming and the economic development that it facilitates.  
Unlike comparisons with foreign nations, states, and property owners, this 
one is invoked far more often by opponents of tribes than the tribes 
themselves.  They invoke it, among other reasons, to argue against tribal 
sovereign immunity95 and to argue that tribes should be subjected to federal 
laws of general application, such as labor laws, that apply to businesses and 
do not expressly exempt Indian nations.96  Tribes have succeeded in 
repelling the comparison for purposes of sovereign immunity,97 based on 
longstanding congressional practice and the constitutional recognition of 
Indian nations as governments in the Indian commerce clause.98  Their 
record has been more mixed with respect to laws of general application, 
especially where those other laws refer specifically to other governmental 
entities and neglect to address the treatment of tribes.99 
The growing inclination of the non-Indian public to equate Indian 
nations with casinos, since those are the entities receiving greatest publicity, 
is something I, as a teacher of Indian law, find disturbing.  In California, for 
example, this simple equation led the Governor to demand that tribes pay 
their “fair share” of gaming proceeds to the state, the share defined accord-
ing to tax obligations of private businesses.100  Although the effort failed to 
pass, it should not have been necessary to explain that Indian nations, 
unlike businesses, have governmental responsibilities to their citizens and 
 
95. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
96. See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 138 (2004).  See generally 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 38, at § 2.03. 
97. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751. 
98. U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3. 
99. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 38, at § 2.03. 
100. See Carole Goldberg, Governor Is Double-Dealing on Indian Gaming; California Has 
Already Broken Too Many Promises to Its Native Tribes, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at B13. 
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territorial inhabitants, including utilities, public safety, and fire protection.  
Furthermore, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Indian nations do 
not have the same freedom as private businesses to allocate their earnings as 
they wish, being limited to funding tribal government operations or 
programs, providing for the general welfare of the tribe and its members, 
promoting tribal economic development, donating to charitable organiza-
tions, and helping to fund operations of local government agencies.101 
What confuses the non-Indian public, I believe, are instances where 
tribes claim the right to conduct themselves in a capacity more closely 
associated with private businesses, especially contributing to state and 
federal elections.  As I have indicated earlier, a case can be made for Indian 
nations’ participation in such political activity, even where state, local, and 
international governments may not.102  But it is a case resting on unique 
characteristics of Indian nations in relation to the United States and the 
states. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As teachers of federal Indian law, we commonly resort to comparisons 
with non-Indian law in order to craft critiques of judicial doctrine and 
positive law in the field.  I count myself as one of the regular practitioners 
of this approach.  It is a powerful way to turn the legal and moral norms of 
the dominant society against its own practices, a hallowed American 
tradition.103 
However, the Supreme Court has been remarkably resistant to such 
comparison-based arguments, which do not seem to have prevented it from 
denying jurisdiction and property rights to Indian nations.  Does that mean 
Indian law scholars and teachers should be employing this type of critique 
more effectively, more selectively, or not at all?  Should we be concerned 
that if we cannot insist on comparisons, the courts will operate uncon-
strained, with even more harmful effects for Indian nations’ sovereignty and 
property? 
Within the field of Indian law, comparison-making is rarely addressed 
at a meta-level, and there is little consideration of whether comparisons in 
one realm may undermine comparisons in another or even the entire enter-
prise of comparison-drawing.  This article has attempted to draw together 
 
101. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2000). 
102. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
103. Civil rights claims, including recent claims by proponents of same-sex marriage, 
typically draw upon fundamental American values of equal dignity of all persons, affirmed at the 
outset of the nation in the Declaration of Independence. 
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many instances of this enterprise so we can begin to view the process more 
holistically, recognizing that the comparisons are in service of a larger 
vision of justice for Native nations in an American system tainted by 
colonialism.  Most of them, I fear, are vulnerable to countercharges of 
inconsistency.  Furthermore, they may distract us from the tougher job 
handed to us by Professor Frickey, which is to explain how much 
colonialism a constitutional system such as the United States can and 
should tolerate. 
